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ABSTRACT 
Many people do all of their banking online, we and our children communicate with peers through 
computer systems, and there are many jobs that require near continuous interaction with computer 
systems. Criminals, however, are also “connected”, and our online interaction provides them a conduit 
into our information like never before. Our credit card numbers and other fiscal information are at risk, 
our children's personal information is exposed to the world, and our professional reputations are on the 
line. 
The discipline of Digital Forensics in law enforcement agencies around the nation and world has 
grown to match the increased risk and potential for cyber crimes. Even crimes that are not themselves 
computer-based, may be solved or prosecuted based on digital evidence left behind by the perpetrator. 
However, no widely accepted mechanism to facilitate sharing of ideas and methodologies has 
emerged. Different agencies re-develop approaches that have been tested in other jurisdictions. Even 
within a single agency, there is often significant redundant work. There is great potential efficiency 
gain in sharing information from digital forensic investigations.  
This paper describes an on-going design and development project between Oklahoma State 
University’s Center for Telecommunications and Network Security and the Defense Cyber Crimes 
Center to develop a Repository of Digital Forensic Knowledge. In its full implementation, the system 
has potential to provide exceptional gains in efficiency for examiners and investigators. It provides a 
better conduit to share relevant information between agencies and a structure through which cases can 
be cross-referenced to have the most impact on a current investigation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Computer Forensics" is defined as "a sub-discipline of Digital & Multimedia Evidence, which 
involves the scientific examination, analysis, end or evaluation of digital evidence in legal matters" 
and "Digital Evidence" is defined as "Information of probative value that is stored or transmitted in 
binary form."  [11] Taking these together or, "Digital Forensics" might be defined as “Scientific 
knowledge and methods applied to the identification, collection, preservation, examination, and 
analysis of information stored or transmitted in binary form in a manner acceptable for application in 
legal matters.” 
Digital forensics has become an indispensable tool for law enforcement. This science is not only 
applied to cases of crime committed with or against digital assets, but is used in many physical crimes 
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to gather evidence of intent or proof of prior relationships. The volume of digital devices that might be 
explored by a forensic analysis, however, is staggering, including anything from a home computer to a 
video game console, to an engine module from a getaway vehicle. New hardware, software, and 
applications are being released into public use daily and analysts must create new and legally 
acceptable methods to address each of them. 
Law enforcement agencies have widely varying capabilities to conduct forensics, sometimes enlisting 
the aid of other agencies or outside consultants to perform analyses. As new techniques are developed, 
internally tested, and ultimately scrutinized by the legal system, new forensic hypotheses are borne 
and proven. When the same techniques are applied to other cases, the new proceeding is strengthened 
by the precedent of prior case. Acceptance of a methodology in multiple proceedings makes it more 
acceptable for future cases. 
Unfortunately, new forensic discoveries are rarely formally shared even within the same agency. 
Sometimes briefings may be given to other analysts within the same agency, although caseloads often 
dictate immediately moving on to the next case. Very little is shared between different agencies, or 
even between different offices of some federal law enforcement communities. The result of this lack 
of sharing is duplication of significant effort to re-discover the same or similar approaches to prior 
cases and a failure to take advantage of precedent rulings that may strengthen the admission of a 
certain process. 
A need exists to create a “National Repository of Digital Forensic Information” to address these 
issues. Harrison, et. al., [7] proposed a repository for sharing information in 2002, but no such effort 
has been accepted by a significant portion of the law enforcement community in a manner that allows 
previous discoveries to be best applied to future cases even within a single agency. Sharing of forensic 
knowledge between law enforcement agencies is almost entirely informal, and based on hearing about 
previous casework and contacting the case agent for more information. 
We propose a design for such a repository that attempts to address many of the recognized 
impediments. The Center for Telecommunications and Network Security (CTANS) at Oklahoma State 
University is collaborating with the Defense Cyber Crimes Center (DC3) to implement a system 
prototype that we expect to make available to other cooperating law enforcement agencies. This paper 
outlines major elements of the working design and expected impediments to successful widespread 
implementation. Application of digital forensics extends far beyond criminal investigations. DC3, for 
instance, is a defense agency, so the structure of this model encompasses not only criminal matters 
[see Figure 1], but also forensic information for foreign intelligence and cyber needs. Approaches in 
media analysis and other forensic components overlap between these areas extensively, so a shared 
repository that can be applied in all areas will be of most benefit. 
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Figure 1: DC3 Digital Forensic Intelligence Model 
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2. WORKING DESIGN MODEL 
Through interactions between CTANS and DC3, as well as other law enforcement agencies, a working 
design for the implementation has been developed. It allows for a modular implementation of features 
and a distributed structure that recognizes a varying willingness to share information between 
agencies. The major components are: 1) Digital Forensic Information Knowledge Base; 2) expert 
system and best practices for Forensic Investigations; 3) certified and available tools index; and 4) 
forensic case index. Each of these is briefly described below. 
3. DIGITAL FORENSIC INTELLIGENCE KNOWLEDGE BASE 
A “knowledge base” is typically a machine-readable repository of information. It goes beyond raw 
facts about a specific domain, but attempts to capture relationships between them and the context in 
which decisions were made. Each investigation and court proceeding are different from any that 
preceded them, although there are many potential commonalities. Given this, it is important to capture 
data, relationships, and contexts. 
The knowledge base is at the core of this project. It is ultimately a type of case tracking system that 
stores all forensic discoveries related to a case from the time evidence is seized until the complete 
forensic analysis is returned to the responsible case investigator. Every law enforcement agency has 
slightly different procedures that they follow. Rules of evidence are similar across jurisdiction, 
however, so the basic process of one agency likely has more commonalities than differences with any 
other. Our design was modeled after the process employed by the Defense Cyber Forensics Laboratory 
(DCFL), which “provides digital evidence processing, analysis, and diagnostics for any DoD 
investigation that requires computer forensic support to detect, enhance, or recover digital media, to 
include audio and video. This includes criminal, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and fraud 
investigations.” [10] 
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Figure 2: Cyber Forensics Investigation Model 
Figure 2 graphically depicts this process. Because DCFL processes evidence for multiple agencies, 
they are often not involved in the seizure of that evidence, so the point of entry into their cycle is when 
the evidence custodian receives the materials from any of the investigating agencies. Imaging, 
examiner assignment, media analysis, various reviews, and administrative actions follow. 
Each of these steps is well documented and will be entered into the repository, along with scans of 
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provided data. It will be indexed on the assigned case number, but will also have a full-text search 
capability to enable one method of locating related data from previous cases. A single case may now 
generate reams of paper reports, so a digital method to locate items within any of many reports and to 
eventually create an automatic cross-index of cases has great potential to aid future analyses. 
4. EXPERT SYSTEM AND BEST PRACTICES 
Newer examiners learn from the human experts in the lab, however, additional support is always 
welcome. An expert system would guide a user through more common forensic analyses with a series 
of questions, the answers to which will generate procedural documents and ask for input based on the 
results. This is not intended to replace human guidance, but may provide ideas about how to proceed 
in a specific case. 
There are numerous articles that explain some best practices in forensics. These can then be modified 
and applied by an analyst as required by a particular investigation. There is no recognized central 
repository of best practices, although several exist, such as through the Scientific Working Group on 
Digital Evidence and the United States Secret Service. When these best practices are used in a case, or 
referenced by the expert system, they will become a part of the repository to fully explain the context 
and applied process for future examiners. 
5. CERTIFIED AND AVAILABLE TOOLS INDEX 
One of the three parts of DC3 is the Defense Cyber Crime Institute (DCCI). It provides legally and 
scientifically accepted standards, techniques, methodologies, research, tools, and technologies for 
computer forensics to meet DoD needs in counterintelligence, intelligence, information assurance, 
information operations, and law enforcement. A major part of that effort is to test tools and techniques 
in a realistic environment for their scientific validity and legal admissibility. This information is used 
to maintain a catalog of tools, along with the testing and analysis report for each. An independent 
validation of a tool prior to its application in an investigation provides enhanced credibility when 
presented in a legal proceeding. 
This catalog is current available within the DoD and law enforcement community by request to DCCI. 
This prevents cyber criminals from exploiting weaknesses in forensic tools that are discovered in this 
process. Each item in the tools catalog has a testing and evaluation report that serves as partial 
justification for its use in any investigation. By including this in the repository, a given object (along 
with the report) can be referenced in many different cases, without the need to include extensive and 
repetitive documentation across multiple cases. 
There are also many tools that are available and not yet tested by DCCI. They may be used by law 
enforcement agencies, if the case dictates that. Each time a tool or technique is applied, that creates a 
record that supports its use or omission in similar future cases. Fully testing and reporting on any tool 
is a very time-consuming process and it is not always possible to wait for full vetting, due to time 
limitations on proceedings. The shared repository allows refinement and acceptability to be enhanced 
among many examiners and agencies, even before full testing. 
6. FUSION, SEARCH AND RETRIEVAL CAPABILITIES 
A shared repository is, in a sense, a database.  The primary need of the repository is to build capability 
to fuse various cyber forensics cases into useful knowledge for the investigator. Information fusion is 
the process of intelligently combining the information (predictions) created and provided by two or 
more information sources (prediction models). Although there is an ongoing debate about the 
sophistication level of the fusion methods to be employed, there is a general consensus that fusion 
(combining forecasts and/or predictions) produces more useful information for decisions to be based 
upon [1]. It has been shown that fusion can improve accuracy, completeness, and robustness of 
information, while reducing uncertainty and bias associated with the individual predictors [3]. 
Once implemented, investigators can then use the repository as a data warehouse to quickly locate 
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similar cases and capabilities.  However, it is important to note that much of the information provided 
by investigators is in text format.  Cyber forensics cases often include long written passage 
documenting the investigation process and the tools used.  Because of this, text mining capabilities 
must be included in the repository. 
Data Mining is the process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful, and ultimately 
understandable patterns in data [6] stored in structured databases, where the data is organized in 
records structured by categorical, ordinal and continuous variables. However, vast majority of real 
world data is stored in documents that are virtually unstructured. According to a recent study by 
Merrill Lynch and Gartner 85 to 90 percent of all organizational data is stored in some kind of 
unstructured form (i.e., as text) [9]. This is where the text mining fits into the picture. Text mining is 
the process of discovering new, previously unknown, potentially useful information from variety of 
unstructured data sources including organizational documents.  
Benefits of text mining are obvious in the areas where a large quantity of textual data is collected from 
organizational transactions. For example, free-form text of user interactions and experiences allows 
trending over time in the areas of problems and complaints, which is clearly input to better equipment 
and system development. By not restricting the feedback to a codified form, the subject can present, in 
her own words, what she experiences and thinks about the domain of interest.  
The common applications of text mining include Information Extraction (identifying key phrases and 
relationships within text by looking for predefined sequences in text via the process called pattern 
matching), Topic Tracking (by keeping user profiles and, based on the documents the user views, 
predicts other documents of interest to the user), Summarization (possessing and summarizing the 
document to its essence in order to save time on the part of the reader), Categorization (identifying the 
main themes of a document and doing so placing the document into a pre-defined set of topics 
categories), Clustering (grouping documents that are similar to each other without having a pre-
defined set of categories), Concept Linking (connect related documents by identifying their commonly 
shared concepts and by doing so help users find information that they perhaps wouldn’t have found 
using traditional searching methods), and Question Answering (deals with finding the best answer to a 
given question by knowledge driven pattern matching). 
7. IMPEDIMENTS TO ADOPTION 
There have been previous attempts to create centralized repositories for digital forensics. None have 
succeeded, except on a localized basis. The reasons most often cited are 1) a desire for discovering 
agency to completely control the data; 2) concerns about confidentiality or classification of data; 3) 
increased task load of entering data to support this initiative; and 4) concerns about unnecessary 
discovery provided to the defense or that more public information will help criminals avoid capture 
and/or prosecution;. This section overviews each of these concerns and provides an illustrative 
example of how our design for information structure leaves control of these important characteristics 
to the individual agencies. 
7.1 Reluctance to Share Information Between Agencies 
Jurisdictions of various law enforcement agencies overlap geographically. Within a single location, 
there may be a County Sheriff, City Police, State Police, and various federal agencies, any of which 
may investigate a crime depending upon the circumstances. There is a great sense of ownership of 
criminal case by investigators, so this overlap creates a kind of competition between the groups.  
Furthermore, law enforcement professionals and, more specifically, cyber security professionals tend 
to rely more on personal social networks rather than more formal repositories of information thus 
impeding information sharing in this domain [8]. 
This clearly extends to new systems. Individual investigators are very willing to seek helpful 
information that is made available from any source, however, most have a great reluctance to release 
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information beyond what is required. This is partially due to the aforementioned competitive nature, 
but also is done to protect their techniques from current and future criminals who may improve their 
skills with any knowledge that is available. Unfortunately, a knowledge repository will require wide 
input in order to leverage the knowledge of others, so this hurdle must be overcome. 
The proposed system provides optional authorship recognition to investigators and agencies that 
contribute information that is used (and therefore linked) to another case. Cases that are repeatedly 
cited would be clearly recognizable as “critical” by their peers. The amount of information provided in 
that recognition would be up to the providing agency.  However, recognition has proven to be a 
successful reward mechanism in the organization science literature [4].  Access to this system will be 
limited to DoD and law enforcement, except as is required by law. This mitigates the concern about 
criminals using the information to improve their own skills. 
7.2 Classification Issues 
Particularly in the DoD and Federal investigative agencies, some cases, or portions thereof, may be 
classified. In that case, the documents, evidence, and systems must be properly secured, and personnel 
with access must be appropriately cleared. An open sharing system is not an option in this case. 
Individual agencies, however, can implement instances of our system to create a knowledge base of 
their own classified projects, with access restrictions on a per-user basis. They may also access their 
own or separate systems to assist in the case on an unclassified system and network.  Further, 
individual investigators in the organization may allow members of their personal social network to 
access their knowledge.  The level of the access can be control by the sharing investigator. 
7.3 Increased Task Load 
Requiring members of investigative agencies to input data will increase their task load.  The individual 
agencies already have information collection mechanisms.  Any attempt to require investigators to 
input data into a central repository will increase their workload.  As such, even those that would want 
to share information would not do it because they have other priorities.  This is a problem often 
overlooked by well-meaning researchers who develop impressive data repositories and wonder why 
investigators will not contribute to their content. Initially, system data within the DC3 system is taken 
entirely from electronic worksheets that the analysts already use. As part of the normal case 
maintenance a clerk submits the entire file to the system, which automatically parses and indexes it. 
Our approach allows organizations to maintain their own data repositories and requires minimal 
increase in taskload. 
7.4 Discovery Vulnerability 
Reticence to share information across agencies can be driven by a variety of factors.  One such factor 
is the concern over disclosure of practices and techniques that will be ultimately be nullified by a 
general awareness among the public and more specifically those committing offenses.  While the 
security of such information may be easily protected with regard to casual observation, if disclosure is 
mandated as part of any court order or legal proceeding, the efficiency of some digital forensic science 
methodologies may be reduced.  Initially, by observing appropriate protocols in the cataloging of 
information, this risk is minimized.   
There are certain legal protections in place that also reduce the potential for disclosure of law 
enforcement techniques and methods including those that are related to digital forensics. For example, 
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 clearly exempts from disclosure “records or 
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such 
law enforcement records or information….would disclose techniques and procedures for law 
enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement 
investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of 
the law…” 
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2006 
 
23 
In court proceedings, discovery of digital forensic techniques by defendants in criminal cases may also 
be limited under the privilege recognized by the Eleventh Circuit court in United States v. Horn 789 
F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1986).   A subsequent case of United States v. Garey, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23477, summarized that court’s holding as “In general, the Eleventh Circuit and other courts applying 
the investigative techniques privilege have held that where the defendant has access to evidence, such 
as the product of the surveillance, from which a jury can determine the accuracy and validity of the 
surveillance equipment and techniques, the defendant has no need for the information that outweighs 
the government's interest in keeping it secret.” 
8. ANCHORED FLEXIBLE LOGICAL MESH STRUCTURE TO LIMIT IMPEDIMENTS 
Every agency has different issues with data sharing and must be given the flexibility to determine the 
degree to which they will use data provided by others and/or contribute information about their 
discoveries to the community. Of course, the global benefit is maximized by everyone sharing all 
discoveries with all other groups, so there must be stimulus for that. Our model can be termed an 
“anchored, flexible, logical mesh.” It is anchored on a core repository that will contain information 
made available to all authorized agencies without restriction. For example, the core repository may 
contain information on relevant laws and legal precedents that all forensics organizations may want to 
access.  Ideally, it would house the common knowledge that all organization would typically maintain 
and therefore remove the need for individual agencies to store and update the information themselves.  
Most participants will at least read information from the core repository. Relationships between 
servers are entirely flexible and up to the administrators of the servers themselves. 
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Figure 3: Anchored Logical Mesh of Repository Servers 
Figure 3 shows several different examples of how this may be implemented. The diagram is not 
intended to reflect current or planned cooperative relationships between specific agencies that might 
participate in the repository. It is provided purely as a notional illustration: 
? The DoD has a repository for storing information that they want to make available to their 
investigative agencies, but not outside the DoD, although the Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service (NCIS), the Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI), and their field offices 
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can directly use and contribute to the core repository as well, or retain data only within their 
agency without elevating it even to the level of DoD. 
? The FBI offices have a similar structure, but one of the field offices may cooperate 
extensively with one of the NCIS or AFOSI field offices in the same city and liberally share 
new discoveries with each other. This creates a new “neighborhood” that is labeled “local 
coop” in the figure. 
? Small agencies may have a single repository for their lessons learned, but they share with the 
core repository. In the extreme, there may be no local storage at all, but a web interface 
directly into the core repository. A small sheriff’s office with a forensic capability can 
leverage the lessons learned in many other participating agencies with little investment. 
? Some data is very sensitive. In the figure, the NSA is shown with a neighborhood among its 
own central node and field offices, but only as a consumer of data from the central repository. 
This will not benefit other agencies; however, some organization’s requirements will prohibit 
sharing information. 
? Finally, there will be some agencies that choose to be entirely isolated. They can neither 
benefit from the central repository nor enhance it, because of a logical and/or physical 
separation. The underlying system design, however, allows them to share among their own 
neighborhood, while retaining complete control of hardware, software, and data. 
Although there are certain impediments to the building a National Forensic Repository, the literature 
suggests that many of these can be overcome by employing various strategies toward promoting 
information sharing, protecting internal investigative procedures, and providing a multi-level 
approach.  The strategies should help mitigate agencies’ concerns toward using such a system.  
Investigators may still rely on their social networks for information regarding a case investigation, 
however our approach offer a means of providing standardization to the process.  It allows investigator 
to share information while preventing release of internally sensitive data. 
9. CONCLUSION  
Network technology available to the average consumer has rapidly expanded. Valuable information 
about many facets of our lives resides on computer systems and traverse public networks. The value of 
this information and the potential value of the misuse of that information create increasing motivation 
to criminals to commit cyber crime. Law enforcement agencies at all levels have met this challenge 
with new investigative techniques and digital forensic analysis to compliment their existing skills. An 
information repository that allows these geographically and bureaucratically diverse groups to share 
information about cyber crimes and digital investigation would aid every agency in successfully and 
efficiently prosecuting a case. 
An ongoing project between Oklahoma State University and the Defense Cyber Crimes Center aims to 
meet this growing need. The National Repository of Digital Forensic Information will provide a 
platform for tracking details of cases as they are handles and a reference system to previous 
investigations that might be related. It will also provide a relevant legal index to help gauge the 
success of various prior approaches in court and an expert system to assist investigators who are 
assigned to case types that are less familiar to them. 
There are many non-technical impediments to widespread adoption of the system to make it most 
valuable. Although some of the recognized issues have been addressed in this paper, more work must 
be done in this area. A full cross-agency implementation of this system has the potential to greatly 
leverage existing examiner and investigator skills and to allow newer investigators to more quickly 
acquire the best approaches for successful legal proceedings. 
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